“I’m Cautiously Optimistic” : Georgina Wright on War in Ukraine, Strategic Autonomy and Macron's Reelection
Europe Programme director at Institut Montaigne, visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US
Our very own Théo Bourgery and Thomas Harbor had a chat with Georgina Wright, Senior Fellow and Europe Programme Director at the French think-tank Institut Montaigne, as well as a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Wright talked to us about the war in Ukraine and its implications for the EU in short and long-run, and tried to define for us the oh-so-hailed concept of “strategic autonomy”. We went on to discuss the role Macron could play at the start of his second term in office, and what EU reforms we can expect to see during his tenure.
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What’s up EU • The Commission announced a new wave of sanctions on Wednesday – the sixth since the beginning of the war – which, were it to be approved by Member States, is expected to include a gradual embargo on Russian oil by year end, though nothing is said of gas. Both the US Treasury and the German Bundesbank have outlined the significant economic risks associated with a complete energy ban. Germany and Austria, though vocal Putin critics, are reluctant - and analysts warn that a ban would mechanically push gas prices up, which may in fine strengthen Russia’s economic position. What do you make of this new package - and what else do you think still needs to be done against Russia?
Georgina Wright • I can rarely remember a time when the EU has acted so quickly and with such unity and determination. Member States have continuously strived to show unity in the context of the war in Ukraine. The first sanctions were fairly easy to adopt: some of the measures impacted a few member states more than others but there was an underlying sense of cohesion and solidarity. With this sixth package, we’re veering into a new territory.
If you put an end to all Russian energy exports to the EU, you are in effect signing up to huge economic loss and shock - that is, to individuals, businesses, industry growth, etc. Some countries will suffer more than others. While all EU Member States recognise the magnitude of the shock, some are calling on the EU to think carefully about all options available in order to reduce that shock as much as possible.
Most member states have agreed to some form of ban on imports of Russian crude oil [the sanctions package is still being negotiated, and has not yet been approved as we went into press]. The question is over which time frame? This new package is expected to entail the termination of imports of Russian oil with a transition period for Slovakia and Hungary up to 2023. And it's not just about ending imports of Russian crude oil: EU vessels will no longer be able to transport oil originating from Russia to the EU or the rest of the world. All services, including insurance and brokerage, will also be banned.
Let's not underestimate how big this is. The EU managed to put this package together because all members agreed there was a political imperative to ban oil imports. On the issue of gas, we know the European Commission has introduced a new [REPowerEU] package of measures back in March to speed up decarbonisation - but it is difficult to suddenly put an end to Russian gas imports without fundamentally disrupting certain areas of economic activity inside the EU. I think we can expect an acceleration and continuation of those negotiations [for a gas ban] - and Member States will need to simply be transparent and acknowledge the economic risk that such a ban would cause.
Overall, I would say I'm cautiously optimistic: the unity among EU Member States is on the whole strong, and there is an acknowledgment of a moral and political imperative to respond to Russia. On banning gas imports specifically, the issue is so complex that I expect there will be people working night and day to look at all possible options – and I think we can expect another sanctions package being adopted sooner rather than later.
WEU • In an interview with WEU in March, Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Chair of the Parliamentary committee on Integration of Ukraine to the EU, saw Ukraine’s membership to the EU as a “question of whether the values of the Western world really exist in practice or are simply declared.” Fast-forward a few weeks, and Ukraine has filed in the questionnaire handed in by Von der Leyen herself in Kyiv that will serve as a starting point for the Commission’s opinion on Ukraine’s membership – a “question of weeks”, von der Leyen said. What are the next steps from here – and are there risks that the Commission over promises to Ukraine on the issue of membership?
G.W. • My first point is that there is no way to fast track membership. You can fast track the process of declaring a third country a ‘candidate’ to the EU, or speed up some aspects of the negotiations, but you cannot become a member of the EU overnight. The accession process is long and complex: there are a number of criteria that need to be met to make sure that the candidate country is able to join the EU without posing risks to the stability of the single market and EU institutions. If you think of Ukraine or Georgia, both have signed Association Agreements with the EU, that is predominantly there to help them meet accession criteria – though many other criteria also need to be met (for example, ensuring they have stable and functioning markets and institutions).
The war in Ukraine has shifted attitudes to enlargement inside the EU; even two years ago, a few member states were adamantly opposed any further enlargement. I don't think they would oppose any further enlargement now - in fact, I think what you're seeing is an openness inside the EU for further enlargement but also the realisation that the accession process takes time because (a) you need to make sure the country joining is indeed fit for membership and (b) that the EU is able to absorb that new country. Many countries, including France, consider EU decision-making power to be too slow, and in need of speeding up - membership must therefore consider these political aspects too: how do you have more Member states while making sure that the EU continues to act quickly and efficiently?
It is this second aspect of EU enlargement which has been less talked about: the EU's own ability to absorb new member states. If Ukraine were to join, it would be the fifth largest member state. That would give it considerable power inside the Council and the European Parliament - it could even change the balance of power inside the EU.
So, my top line is: there's no way you can fast track membership. Negotiations are essential to make sure that both sides are ready for enlargement. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, a unanimous vote at the Council is required, as well as a majority vote from the European Parliament. Ratification at the national and regional level may also be required in certain countries - France may even need to organise a referendum. If you want to make sure that that ratification is going to succeed then you need to really make sure that both sides are ready to absorb. That said, I think there is more readiness for further enlargement and it should, ultimately, facilitate Ukraine’s membership process.
WEU • There is a thread running through our conversation so far, which boils down to this next concept of “strategic autonomy” – hailed as a key priority of the French Presidency of the Council of the EU (PFEU). Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a brutal reminder that the security that Europeans have enjoyed for decades cannot be taken for granted. At the same time, the US has taken a strong lead in the Ukrainian crisis, warning early of Vladimir Putin’s plans to invade, and pushing Europeans to react fast, to punish Russia and help Ukraine. Furthermore, only a few weeks ago, Germany announced her decision to buy American-made fighter jets, despite her stated commitment to the development of the European defence industry. How do we define strategic autonomy? And are Europeans too used to the safety of America’s embrace to be able to forge a meaningful common strategic agenda?
G.W. • I agree that there is no common definition of strategic autonomy. It sometimes feels like such a nebulous term that no one seems to really understand how to move forward in the debate. But I also think that it has been superseded with another concept, that of European sovereignty, for two reasons. One, France, one of the most active countries in the EU, has slowly abandoned the term strategic autonomy in favour of the concept of sovereignty. Two, some Member States have felt deeply uncomfortable with the concept of strategic autonomy, thinking it signals independence from the United States at a time when many EU Member States are very much dependent on the US’ security umbrella. They also appear to prefer the term sovereignty.
But to go back to your question: what does strategic autonomy mean? I think it means two things, broadly: the ability to defend yourself and the ability to set the rules that apply to you. In other words, do we want to be in a world where the rules that apply to us are being set by other superpowers such as the US or China, or do we want to be in a position to decide what happens on our own territory? Take defence: the war in Ukraine has exacerbated the fact that we are highly dependent on the United States for our security and intelligence. But we need to be in a position to respond to crises in our neighbourhood not only because we are so dependent on the US, but also because the United States itself is actually calling on us to be more capable to respond to threats in our region - independently and through the Transatlantic Alliance.
WEU • Assuming progress on strategic autonomy is possible, it remains unclear what it entails in practice. What concrete steps / initiatives do you think we can expect to see that will make this strategic autonomy concept into a tangible reality?
G.W. • Take the term sovereignty: you have tech sovereignty, digital sovereignty, food, sovereignty, health sovereignty, etc. All these issues are being talked about in the EU but they don’t necessarily signal doing things independently – but rather being able to act and decide even in times of crises. COVID and the war in Ukraine have shown how geopolitical crises can suddenly impact supply chains and leave people in the EU with limited access to necessary medicine or food. So it is about finding an equilibrium between making sure that we are able to sustain ourselves while maintaining trade openness and cooperation.
WEU • In reaction to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive in order to facilitate the welcoming and protecting of Ukrainian refugees. Although this Directive was adopted in 2001, it had never been used before, not even during the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2015, which saw many Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis fleeing their countries. Do you think that the EU’s welcoming attitude towards Ukrainian refugees could mark a positive turn in the EU’s migration and asylum policy towards all people, or is this more of a one-time occurrence?
I don't think this signals a change in attitude or policy. Instead, this is very much an “extraordinary measure for extraordinary time” approach. Ultimately, we’re talking about immigration from one country only, not a series of countries - so it feels like while immigration numbers are still significant, they’re smaller in people’s minds because we’re talking about immigration from one country only. And, in many people’s minds, we are only welcoming Ukrainian refugees for the duration of the war. We heard this discourse during the French elections, when [far-right contender to Emmanuel Macron in the 2022 Presidential elections] Marine Le Pen argued that of course the EU should welcome Ukrainian refugees, but only for the duration of the war.
That said, this does not mean the EU should not be thinking about a new kind of immigration policy. The problem is, of course, asylum: it's very much a national competence, and the EU has very limited legal competence to act in this area. Macron has been pushing for more high level political discussions on this, and I suspect he will continue to do so. His take is that he wants to preserve Schengen, but feels it is being threatened, so conversations at the highest political level are more than necessary. Plus, it is a fact that people will continue coming to Europe and we need to be in a position to welcome these people with dignity, to resettle them and to have a system that works with much greater collaboration. Think back to 2015: Spain and Italy had been asking for help from the EU for months and there only was a very slow response. In a sense, the war in Ukraine will force more conversations, but I wouldn't say that more conversations are the same as a change in attitude.
WEU • You said in an interview with the Globalist last week that Emmanuel Macron, who was reelected for a second term in office last week, will want to go “much further and faster than he has over the past five years” on European matters. Yet, fundamental disagreements remains between Member States, and Macron himself faces an electorate where euroscepticism is rife. Are there any reasons to believe major reforms of the Union can be achieved in the current political environment - and, if so, which ones?
G.W. • Yes, I think we can expect Macron to go further and faster than during his first term. For one, this is his last term in office [the French Constitution only allows for two consecutive terms]. Secondly, Europe has been a central pillar of his domestic and foreign policy. Thirdly, he believes that Europe is part of the solution to many problems that French and European citizens face.
I think Macron will not be afraid to tackle politically sensitive topics. During his first term, he did talk about the Eurozone and Schengen reforms but he didn't push - so I imagine he will be pushing for more in-depth conversations this time round. I also think Macron has pushed for a change of method in the EU, realising that it is not enough to rely on Germany to get things done, but you need to build bilateral relations with other member states as well as through EU institutions. These relationships will be essential to getting thing done. Finally, I expect he will push harder on climate. He knows that this is a big issue, particularly for young French voters who came out in droves to vote for him.
More importantly, I believe Macron will be open to exploring other ways of cooperating inside the EU. In times of crisis, the EU has shown that it could act decisively and quickly and with unity: why not act decisively and quickly in “normal times”, i.e. when not in crisis? So, I think France will be open to start new conversations in different settings such as small multilateral groups, ad hoc groups, etc. to more efficiently push for reforms inside the EU.
Finally, to take a slightly French-centric view, I think Macron is going to try to show that being part of the EU serves French interests and that France plays a key role in shaping the EU. He needs to convince French citizens, who are more eurosceptic than in many other EU countries, that there is true merit to being a member of the EU.
WEU • Is there a risk, in exploring new ways of making decisions through, say, smaller fora, of creating a “multi speed” Europe? Is that something we want, and how do we anticipate the political hurdles?
G.W. • I think there is always a risk of a “multi-speed” Europe - but, if you look at it another way, we cannot be satisfied with an EU that is unable to move, or moves slowly, because of dissenting views. So, we could explore a world where you would have a core group of countries. It might obviously not work for areas such as competition or rule of law, because that’s at the foundation of the Union - but it could work for, say, defence or reforms of international organisations. Macron said so during the Grand Débat: if you start talking about an Europe des Nations, it’s not the EU anymore. So, there are certain things that you cannot change but on others, you could look to promote and facilitate the creation of a core group of EU nations.
WEU • How successful do you view the french presidency of the Council of the EU?
G.W. • It was an incredibly ambitious presidency with over sixty priorities - and on certain issues, the PFEU has been successful. Let’s remember that it took place at a time of unprecedented crisis, with war in Europe. France has been a key team leader, efficiently facilitating a set of discussions at the Council. Of course, there were the economic sanctions against Russia - mainly led by the Commission and the High Representative, but France played a key role. France also secured a number of wins on issues it had announced it wanted to advance on: take the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA); the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM); and the national minimum wage framework, which is likely to get through. There have also been advances on the Conference for the Future of Europe and the adoption of the Strategic Compass on defence.
But I would say that it is hard to measure the role of the Presidency. It’s very much teamwork after all so let’s not over exaggerate the role of the Presidency of the Council: it does not mean you are the President of Europe.
We would like to extend our deepest thanks to Georgina Wright and her team, especially Cécilia Vidotto Labastie, Blanche Leridon and Maxime Cayrou. This interview was conducted in English. Many thanks to those who helped prepare this interview — Maxime de la Rochère, Nastassia Maes, Thomas Harbor and Théo Bourgery.